NOTE

possible submission to speculative temptations, and removes it from this
category. Only time and experience will indicate whether restrictions with
respect to management and liquidation, placed on mortgage pools alone,
are necessary to the successful operation of the common fund and single
mortgage or security forms of commingled investment. In addition, taxability under the present statutory structure must await interpretations of
the Federal Reserve Board. One thing, however, seems clear: since the
granting of certain privileges under the statute conflict with fundamental
principles of trust law, it would seem well to require strict compliance
with the act and careful supervision of commingled investment.
C. A. W., Jr.

NOTE
Rights of an Assignee of an Installment Sales Contract as Against
a Subsequent Claimant Through the Original Seller
The ever-increasing amount of business being transacted by installment sales 1 and the rise of the financing company as a substitute for large
capitalization in retail business together place a premium on anticipating
the result of a contest between an assignee of an installment contract and
a subsequent party claiming a superior right to the property through-the
same seller. The operative facts in such a conflict are these: A sells goods
to B under an installment sales contract, reserving title in himself until
the full purchase price is paid. A then assigns the contract to C, usually a
financing company. Subsequently D, some fourth party, acquires through
A a claim to the property which he sets up against C. Obviously, further
particularization is required before the complete picture of a specific case
can be obtained. These additional facts may be secured by any combination of the following possibilities: the assignment from A to C may be
absolute or merely for collateral; at the time of the assignment A may or
may not have been in possession of the goods which were the subject of
the installment sale; if A was not in possession at the time of the assignment, he may or may not have retaken possession before D acquired his
interest; finally, D may be either a creditor of A., a bona fide purchaser
from A, or a trustee in bankruptcy, administering the estate of A. An
endeavor has been made to study the cases that have come before the
courts with this basic set of facts present and to catalog them according
to additional facts which have been found to be of significance in producing the results obtained. Occasionally, the underlying factors of the
decisions have been indicated. However, it is the primary purpose of
this Note to indicate what the courts have done in the past with reference
to a particular fact situation in the hope that this will prove of assistance in
determining what is likely to happen in the future should a similar situation arise.
i. Installment sale is used throughout this Note to indicate either a conditional
sale or a bailment lease with an option to buy. Although different in many respects,
the courts treat them exactly alike with relation to this problem.
This Note does not deal with cases involving the sale of goods held by the seller
under a trust receipt. This is a very common instrument for security purposes and
is similar in many respects to the instant problem. Considerations of time and
space have precluded its inclusion here. An excellent discussion of the cases involving trust receipts is available. See Hanna, Trust Receipts (1931) 19 CALiF. L.
REv. 257.
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I. ABSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT
A. Assignor in Possession of the Goods
The first situation to be considered arises where A has entered into
an installment sales contract for the sale of goods but has never delivered
them to B. This situation frequently presents itself where A is an automobile dealer and wishes to acquire automobiles to use as demonstrators,
without having to put up the capital himself. He executes the installment
contract with one of his salesmen and immediately assigns it absolutely to
C, a financing company, who supplies him with the necessary money to
pay the manufacturer. A at all times retains possession and finally D,
some fourth party, either attaches the car for a debt owed by A, or buys
the car from A.2 If purely abstract concepts are applied to all the above
transactions it might be said that A retained title to the car when he executed the installment contract with B, who would acquire the right to
obtain title upon payment of the installments. After A assigned his title
to C, he no longer had any interest in the car that could be sold or attached.
It would then seem to follow that C's claim is superior to that of D. Or
Section 25 of the Uniform Sales Act 8 might be applied; A would be regarded as an owner who had conveyed title but retained possession. Then
if D is a person acting in good faith, his right is superior to that of C. If
only the results of the cases are observed, it appears that out of the ten
cases which have arisen involving these facts, six protect the right of the
bona fide purchaser, D, while the remaining four extend the superior right
to the assignee, C. In arriving at these results the courts have sometimes
followed doctrinal reasoning and sometimes cut through the legal picture
to examine the facts. The following principal cases exemplify different
analyses.
Assignee v. Creditors of Sellers: Apparently this situation has arisen
only once. 4 In that one case, the court was not willing to restrict itself
to employment of traditional dogma. It reasoned that since the original installment contract was fictitious and the dealer, A, at all times intended to pay the installments himself, he had in effect assigned the title
to C as security for a loan for he could regain title by repaying the amount
advanced. This was in effect a chattel mortgage; not being recorded as
such it was invalid as to everyone except the immediate parties. The result was to give D, the creditor of A, a right superior to that of C, the
financing company.
Assignee v. Bona Fide Purchaser from Seller: Of cases in this
situation from nine separate jurisdictions, strikingly enough, five were
decided in favor of the bona fide purchaser and four in favor of the assignee.
The rights of the bona fide purchaser were upheld on at least three different
theories. Tripp v. National Shawmut Bank of Boston I adopted the view
that A was an owner who passed title to C but retained possession of the
goods; therefore he was within Section 25 of the Uniform Sales Act 1 and
could give title to D, a bona fide purchaser. 7 In Kearby v. Western States
2. See Tripp v. National Shawmut Bank, 263 Mass. 505, 161 N. E. 9o4 (2928)
for a good discussion of the business situation involved in these salesmen cases.
3. 2 U. L. A. §25.

4.Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Callahan, 271 Mass. 556, 171 N. E.
820 (1930).
5. 263 Mass. 505, 161 N. E. 904 (1928); General Credit Corp. v. Kapun, 237
App. Div. 694, 262 N. Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dep't, 1933).
6. 2 U. L. A. §25.

7. Here the Massachusetts court did not hold that it was a chattel mortgage as
they did in a later case arising on substantially similar facts, except that the contest
was with a creditor. See supra note 3.
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Securities Co.," since the assignee financing company was aware of the
custom of A to retain possession of the cars, the court applied the doctrine
of estoppel to prevent the assignee from setting up a superior right over
the bona fide purchaser. Gump Investment Co. v. Jackson 9 presents the
practical argument that the assignee financing company is constantly dealing with this sort of transaction and is in the field for profit and is therefore in a better position to bear the loss than an individual purchaser who
walks into a dealer's establishment to buy a new car.
On the other hand, Patterson Co. v. Peoples Loan and Savings Co 0°
adopts the strictly "legalistic" approach that A had divested himself of all
title to the car when he assigned the installment contract to C, and thereafter he could convey nothing to D, the bona fide purchaser. The court
refused to apply any doctrine of estoppel unless "actual fraud" could be
shown, which of course would rarely be the case. In addition, it seemed
-to feel that the recording of the installment contract should have put the
purchaser on notice that A could no longer deal with the car as his own,
and though no provision was made for recording the assignment, he should
have inquired to find if one had in fact been made.
In most of these situations the courts seemed particularly concerned
with the nature of the transaction that took place between A, the dealer,
and B, the salesman of A. Was this a real or a fictitious sale? Did A ever
give possession to B? Perhaps the courts feel that this situation presents
a well-prepared scheme to defraud innocent purchasers from A, and it
would best be prevented by requiring the assignee to inquire at the time
of the assignment to see that there is a real purchaser for the purported
installment contract and that the dealer was not standing in a position to
defraud an innocent purchaser.
B. Assignor Not in Possession at the Time of the Assignment
The next situation to be examined arises when A enters into a concededly valid installment sales contract with B, transferring possession of
the goods to him and retaining title till the full purchase price is paid. 4
then assigns the contract to C. It has been found important to distinguish
the cases in which, at the time D claimed his interest, A was in possession,
from those in which A was not in possession.
(i) A Not in Possession: As might be expected, cases seldom arise
where D subsequently claims an interest from A when the latter had never
been repossessed of the goods. This would seem to be the dearest case for
the court to apply the reasoning that A has completely divested himself of
8. 31 Ariz. 104, 250 Pac. 766 (1926). In Finance Corp. of America v. Walpole,
Kan. 250, 295 Pac. 643 (i93i) the court placed particular emphasis on the fact
that the assignee had authorized the dealer to repossess.
9. 142 Va. X90, 128 S. E. 5o6 (1925).
IO. 158 Ga. 5o3, 123 S. E. 704 (1924). Here the vendor had subsequently mortgaged the property. However, the court treated the mortgagee in the light of a
bona fide purchaser. In Drew v. Feuer, I85 Minn. 133, 240 N. W. 14 (931) the
court declared that the interest of the assignee would be protected unless actual fraud
could be shown. The court expressly refused to follow Gump Investment Co. v.
Jackson, 142 Va. 190, 128 S. E. 5o6 (1925). Commercial Credit Co. v. Hardin, i75
Ark. 81i, 300 S. W. 434 (1927) is an example of how complicated the facts of cases
within the present study can become. Although it is not clear, the case seems to
uphold the rights of the assignee on the basis of a straight question of priority in
time. Commercial Credit Co. v. Cutler, 176 Wash. 423, 29 P. (2d) 686 (1934), in a
sLx to three decision, upheld the rights of the assignee. The majority of the court
seemed to base its opinion on the grounds that there was a valid sales contract with
the salesman; the dissenters point out that the trial court found to the contrary.
132
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any power to deal with the goods by his assignment to C, and that subsequently D could acquire nothing from A. In apparently the only case on
point, the court upheld the rights of C, the assignee, using principally this
type of reasoning." A, after assigning the first installment contract, had
entered into a new contract with the same buyer and assigned the second
contract to a bona fide purchaser. 1 2 The first contract had been recorded
with the assignment indicated. In addition to the above reasoning, the
court also indicated that the recording of the installment contract (no mention of the assignment) gave notice to the subsequent assignee of the new
contract and therefore protected the assignee of the first contract. Linton
v. Butz' 8 is often cited for the proposition that the assignee would prevail
over creditors of a seller who subsequent to the assignment had never been
repossessed. There a lessor assigned his interest in the leased chattels to
the plaintiff who left the goods with the same lessee. The defendant, a
creditor of the original lessor, then attached the goods in the hands of the
lessee. The court upheld the rights of the assignee on the ground that
there had been a valid transfer of the lessor's interest prior to the attachment. The force of the holding is greatly enhanced by the realization that
a typical installment sale in Pennsylvania is the bailment lease, where the
In view of the
seller is treated as a lessor and the buyer as a lessee.'
economic utility of the practice of assigning installment contracts to financing companies, this seems the clearest case for protecting their interests.
(2) A Retakes Possession: Most common of all the possible factual
situations heretofore outlined is that occurring when A, having made the
installment contract, delivered possession of the goods to B, and assigned
his interest absolutely to C, then becomes repossessed of the goods; whereupon a fourth party D claims an interest in the goods superior to that of
C. Again if the dogma that a person can acquire no more title than the
person had through whom he claims were applied, then it would appear
that C had a superior right to D, for A had no interest that D could acquire. On the other hand, it might be said that D is an innocent purchaser
for value from A who had apparent title to the goods. Then it would follow that C, though the true owner, would be estopped to assert his claim.
The result of the eleven cases that have arisen on these facts has been that
in eight the superior right was given to C, the assignee, and in the remaining three D's claim was upheld. The following cases indicate the language
the courts have used to express their views.
Assignee v'. Creditors of Seller: Both of the cases found in which
the creditors of the seller claimed a superior right to the goods after they
had been returned to his possession upheld the rights of the prior assignee.
In Western States Securities Co. v. Mosher 1" A's landlord attached the
goods for rent while they were being displayed in his showroom after having been returned by the installment buyer. The court adopted the view
II. New Britain Real Estate & Title Co. v. Hartford Acceptance Corp., 112 Conn.
613, 153 Atl. 658 (i93i).
12. There may be some question in other fields of the law as to whether an
assignee for value is a bona fide purchaser. However, in none of these cases does
the problem seem to have been raised, inasmuch as the court always treats a subsequent assignee of a second contract as a bona fide purchaser without any discussion of a contrary view.
13. 7 Pa. 89 (1847).
14. Montgomery, The Pennsylvania Bailment Lease (193) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv.
920.
15. 28 Ariz. 420, 237 Pac. 192 (1925).
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that inasmuch as A had previously parted with all his title to C, nothing
was left which D could attach. 16
Assignee v. Bona Fide Purchaser from A: In cases from eight
jurisdictions, five courts upheld the right of the assignee and three favor
the bona fide purchaser. It would seem very important to determine
whether the assignee knew or had reason to know of the repossession if
the courts are willing to work out an estoppel. However, the reports of
most of the cases do not indicate whether there was authority for or knowledge of repossession. Even in the cases where the courts consider the
question, it is not clear what factors control their decision. It is therefore
impossible to classify such cases on the existence or non-existence of these
factors. The selection of cases that follow typify the manner in which the
courts have handled this problem.
Probably the case most frequently cited to support the claims of C,
assignee, is State Bank of Black Diamond v. Johnson.17 In this case B
returned the goods to A who resold them to D. It is not indicated whether
C knew of the repossession. The court applied the dogma that A had
divested himself of title by assigning his interest to C and had nothing left
to convey to D. Such would-be purchasers, said the court, bought "...
from one who had no title whatever therein. They acquired no more title
or interest . . . than as if they had purchased it from one who had stolen
it." Is Lynn Morris Plan Co. v. Gordon ' 9 is another leading case using
the same kind of language. The court said that A was "no better than a
stranger to the transaction. The defendant (D) acquired no greater title
than the vendor (A) was able to convey." 20
In direct contrast is Truck Tractor & Forwarding Co. v. Baker.2The court did not clearly express its reasons for upholding the right of D,
the bona fide purchaser. It is not indicated whether the assignee knew
of the repossession; but from the tenor of the opinion it would have made
little difference one way or the other. 22 The underlying theme of the 2opinion seems to be estoppel based on a public policy against secret liens. 3
Assignee v. Trustee in Bankruptcy: Only one case has ever been
reported which clearly involved the situation where, after assigning the
16. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men, 192 Wash.
613, 74 P. (2d) I98 (937), the other case, involving a receiver of the then insolvent
seller, upheld the rights of the assignee on precisely the same grounds.
17. 104 Wash. 550, 177 Pac. 34o (1918) (the court discussed the possible effect

that the recording of the assignment might have had, but did not pass upon it).
Accord: Commercial Credit Co. v. Neel, 91 Fla. 505, 107 So. 639 (1926); C. I. T.
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Winslow, 33 Ariz. 483, 266 Pac. 6 (1928). Abels v.
National Bond & Investment Co., 13 N. E. (2d) 9o3 (Ind. App. 1938) sevible.
18. State Bank of Black Diamond v. Johnson, 1O4 Wash. 550, 559, 117 Pac.
340, 342 (1918).
19. 251 Mass. 323, 146 N. E. 685 (1925).
Accord: Colella v. Essex County
Acceptance Corp., 288 Mass. 221, 192 N. E. 622 (934).
20. 251 Mass. at 325, 146 N. E. at 685.
21. 281 Pa. 145, 126 Atl. 239 (1924).
Accord: Iowa Guarantee Mtge. Corp.
v. Universal Credit Co., 217 Iowa 1243, 253 N. W. 23 (1934) (in this case the
assignee had clearly authorized the repossession).
22. The court discusses the possibility of agency between the assignee and the
dealer. There is also language indicating apparent ownership. 281 Pa. at 148, 126
Atl. at 241. The emphasis seems to be placed on the latter. However, the court
declared that "so far as it appears the tractor company never held the truck as bailee
of the plaintiff". 281 Pa. at 149, 126 Atl. at 241. This seems to preclude any chance
that the plaintiff authorized the dealer to repossess.
23. The only case denying an assignee a superior right to that of a subsequent
bona fide purchaser because of failure to record the installment contract or the notes
indicating the retention of title involved facts falling within the instant group of
cases. See Chattanooga Finance Corp. v. Bitting, 38 Ga. App. 490, i44 S. E. 331 (1928).
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installment contract to C, A went bankrupt having repossessed the goods."
The court upheld the right of the assignee using the traditional language
that A had parted with all his title to C and there was nothing for the
trustee in bankruptcy to acquire.
It is submitted that perhaps the courts are placing more emphasis on
the fact that the assignee, C, knew or did not know of the repossession than
the reports of the cases would seem to indicate. The tenor of most of the
opinions that uphold his rights seems to be that there was nothing that he
could have done to protect himself and in view of the economic importance
of the business he should be protected. The opinions that support the bona
fide purchaser emphasize the "duty" of the assignee to investigate and find
out if A has possession of the goods.

II.

ASSIGNMENT AS COLLATERAL SECURITY

Many courts and commentators declare that the important distinguishing fact in deciding a controversy between the assignee of an installment
contract and a subsequent party claiming through the same seller is whether
the assignment was for security or an absolute transfer.2 5 However, to
obtain an adequate picture of the existing case law, other facts must also
be considered. For purposes of clarity and comparison, the categorical
arrangements of the previous section dealing with absolute assignments will
be adopted.
A. Assignor in Possession
The fact situation now involved arises when A executes an installment contract with B but does not give B possession of the goods. Having
assigned his interest in the contract to C as security for a loan, A purports
to transfer title to the goods to D. Again, the dogma could be applied that
since A had previously assigned all his title to C there was nothing left
to convey to D. Or, since in effect A is assigning his interest in goods of
which he is presently possessed to C who is then holding the interest as
security, the transaction might be looked upon as a "chattel mortgage" and
unless recorded as such, it would be invalid as against all subsequent claimants. Only three cases seem to have arisen on these facts, two sustaining
the claim of D and the other appearing to give the superior right to C.
Assignee v. Bona Fide Purchaser:Burnett County Abstract Co. v. Eau
Claire Citigens Loan & Investment Co.26 involved a typical installment
sales contract between the seller and his salesman, which had been assigned
as collateral for a loan. The court upheld the rights of the bona fide purchaser on two separate grounds. First, inasmuch as there was no delivery
to the first "purchaser", the sale was void or at least fraudulent. Therefore, as the assignee claimed through this sale, his rights were inferior to
24. In re B. & B. Motor Sales Corporation, 277 Fed. 8o8 (D. N. J., 1922).
In
Taylor v. Goodrich Tire & Rubber Co., 2o Tenn. App. 352, 98 S. E. (2d) 1o94
(1935) there were several contracts and cars involved. The court divides its discussion on each one, and at p. iio6 (Bumpus-Irwen Car) seems to be in accord with
the B. & B. case.
25. Lynn Morris Plan Co. v. Gordon, 25r Mass. 323, 146 N. E. 685 (1925);
ESTRICH, INSTALMENT SALES (1926) § 166; Note (1932) 16 MINN. L. REv. 689,
691. While the latter treats the same subject as the instant Note, an attempt has
been made to present the problem from a different approach.
26. 216 Wis. 35, 255 N. E. 89o (1934), ig MmAQ. L. REv. 45. Actually here the
"bona fide purchaser" was the assignee of a second installment contract, the assignment being absolute.
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those of the subsequent purchaser. Secondly since this was a transfer of
the dealer's interest in personalty as security, it was deemed to be a chattel
mortgage and, unrecorded as such, was invalid as against subsequent purchasers. While Parsons v. Rice,2 7 the only other decision on point, does
not dearly set forth what the court regards as the controlling principle, it
is certain that the court did not consider the transaction recordable as a
chattel mortgage. In fact, it was shown that the recording would do no
good since no statute authorized the recordation of assignments of installment contracts. A new trial was ordered to determine, on the basis of
new testimony, whether or not the assignee had authorized the seller to
resell the goods. However, it seemed clear from the previous testimony
that the assignee knew of the seller's possession, yet the decision of the
court below had been for the assignee. This case would seem to stand
for the proposition that unless the assignee has authorized the seller to
resell, his interests are superior to those of the bona fide purchaser.
Assignee v. Trustee in Bankruptcy: Straus v. Commercial Delivery
Co. 28 seems to be the only case that has arisen under this set of facts. After
carefully analyzing them, with emphasis on A's possession and the assignment being for security, the court concludes that "While the instrument is
not in form a chattel mortgage, it is in substance," 29 and since it was not
recorded as such, it was not valid as against the trustee in bankruptcy.
The opinions deciding controversies arising above, as was noted in the
case of an absolute assignment, seem to emphasize the fictitious nature of
the A-B transaction and indicate that the court does not consider it unreasonable to require the financing companies to inquire and ascertain that
there was a valid installment sale.
B. Assignor Not in Possession
Here the assignment as collateral security was made at a time when
the goods were in the hands of the installment buyer. There are relatively
few cases that have arisen involving these facts so it is not clear how important is the distinction between the cases where A has never again taken
possession from those in which he did again acquire possession. One case
indicates that it is of no import, while another seems to rest its opinion on
the fact of repossession. In view of the few decisions on these facts, and
the great difference in the use of language by the courts, no thread can be
found running throughout. Probably the best picture can be obtained by
simply presenting the cases.
(i) Possession Never Retaken: This is the situation where A, having delivered the goods to B and assigned the A-B installment contract to
C as collateral, attempts to convey the title to the goods to D, or D, a creditor of A attaches the goods.
Assignee v. Creditors of Seller: Although there appears to be no
reported decision involving these exact facts, a Pennsylvania case involving a straight lease may be considered strong persuasive authority in protecting the assignee under these circumstances20 Here the lessor having
assigned his interest in the leased goods to secure a loan, upon the default
of the lessee, the assignee secured the sale of the chattels in order to protect
27. 81 Mont. 509, 264 Pac. 396 (1928).
28. 113 Atl. 6o4 (N. J. Ch. pIpi).
29. Id. at 6o5.
3o. Mosher v. Grange Nat'l Bank of Susquehanna, 8 D. & C. 617 (Pa. C. P.,
x926). It must be kept in mind that Pennsylvania does not have a chattel mortgage act.
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his loan. The creditors of the lessor then sued for the proceeds of the
sale. The rights of the assignee were sustained on the ground that the
transfer of the lessor's interest when the goods were in the possession of
the lessee was an effective transfer of the former's right to possession upon
default of the lessee. When the assignee repossessed, he completed his
right to the property which was superior to that of the creditors of the
lessor.
Assignee v. Bona Fide Purchaser: Worcester Morris Plan Co. v.
Mader8 is a leading case cited for the proposition that any assignment of
an installment sales contract as collateral security for a loan is a chattel
mortgage and, unless recorded as such, is invalid as to third parties. Moreover, the circumstances involved fit perfectly within the outline of the
hypothetical facts of this section. In treating of the assignment of A's
interest, the court remarked that "It was in effect a bill of sale, and as
it was given as security for the payment of a debt, it constituted a mortgage." 82 Expressly considered of no significance was the fact that the
possession of the goods was in the installment buyer and therefore delivery
could not be made.
Assignee v. Trustee in Bankruptcy: Unfortunately, a case involving
the basic set of facts sought under this sub-title could not be found. However, there is a case involving circumstances in which a bailor transferred
his interest in the bailed chattels as security for a loan.38 In his subsequent
bankruptcy, the trustee sought to establish a superior right in himself as
against the assignee. In upholding the rights of the assignee, the court
declared that inasmuch as a valid assignment had occurred, nothing remained in the bankrupt which might pass to his trustee. The tenor of
the opinion would indicate that an assignment of an installment sales contract would be regarded in the same light.
(2) Dealer Retakes Possession: Strangely enough, only three cases
seem to have arisen which involve the instant set of facts. All three involved suits between the assignee, C, and a bona fide purchaser, D. In
two the rights of the bona fide purchaser were upheld, while in the third
the claim of the assignee was sustained. In Commercial Motors Mortgage
Corp. v. Waters ' 4 a seller assigned the installment contract to the plaintiff
as collateral. Upon default, the seller repossessed the goods and placed
them in his show room. The defendant then bought the goods, believing
them to belong to the seller. Finding that plaintiff either knew or had
reason to know of the repossession, the court upheld the rights of the bona
fide purchaser on the basis of estoppel. This it found present from a very
close relationship over a series of dealings between the seller and the assignee and from the display of the goods in the seller's show room. In
direct conflict is Pacific Acceptance Corp. v. Bank of Italy,15 in which the
controlling facts were the same as those of the Waters case except that
there it was perfectly clear that the assignee had authorized the seller to
repossess. However, the court points out that there was no authority to
sell and that merely allowing the seller to repossess the goods would be no
grounds for an estoppel.
31. 236 Mass. 435, 128 N. E. 777 (3920).
32. Id. at 438, 128 N. E. at 777. Mass. Gen. Acts (915)
c. 226 deals with the
recording of mortgages on personalty, and expressly makes bills of sale given for
security recordable under the act. The court refused to treat this case on an assignment of a chose in action.
33. In re Miller Pure Rye Distilling Co., 176 Fed. 6o6 (E. D. Pa., igo).
34. 280 Pa. 177, 124 Atl. 327 (3924).
35. 59 Cal. App. 76, 2o9 Pac. 1024 (1922).
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Bank of Californiav. Danamiller" is one of the cases most frequently
cited for the proposition that a bona fide purchaser's interests are protected if the assignment is merely for collateral. In this case, the assignee
had no knowledge of the repossession by the seller. Nevertheless, the court
decided in favor of the bona fide purchaser but was not very clear in explaining its reasons. Perhaps it was on the ground that since the assignment was for collateral, the assignee only secured a right to payment and
not to the goods. A more probable basis was that, since the assignee could
have protected himself by taking a chattel mortgage, and since he was organized to do business in this sort of thing, he should bear the loss. The
court did not discuss this as a possible chattel mortgage which had not been
recorded.
It cannot be said that an assignment of an installment contract as
security is or is not a chattel mortgage. Since chattel mortgages are
creatures of statute for purposes of recordation, it is purely a question
of statutory construction in each state. However, it might safely be said
that the situation that prompted the passage of the statutes, i. e., the possibility of secret liens, applies equally well to both fact situations.
III.

EFFECT OF RECORDATION

A primary objective of the present study has been to discover precisely the effect of recording the installment contract or the assignment
thereof in protecting the interests of the assignee. However, it has proved
impossible to catalog the cases either on the basis of their facts or their
holdings. An effort has been made to indicate those cases in which recording was considered. Only a few courts have dealt with the problem clearly
enough to supply a basis for expressing an opinion as to what that court
might do in the future if the problem were properly urged upon it.
In Connecticut 37 and Georgia Is the courts are fairly well committed
to the doctrine that the recording of the installment contract, with an indication of the assignment, will be notice to the world sufficient to protect
the assignee's interests from any subsequent claimants. In Minnesota 31
there is a case holding that the mere recording of the installment contract
before the assignment will suffice to protect the assignee against a subsequent bona fide purchaser from the seller who retained possession.
On the other hand, Arizona 40 and Montana-4 have both definitely
stated that the recording of both the contract and the assignment will not
serve as constructive notice to anyone. "There is no provision of law for
the filing of the assignment, and, as it was not entitled
to filing, such action
42
did not import constructive notice to plaintiff."
Only one state has passed a statute directed at the recordation of the
assignment of installment contracts. 43 However, in providing for recording only when the assignment is for collateral security, the applicability of
the statute is greatly curtailed.
36.

1:25

Wash.

255, 215

Pac.

321

(1923).

37. New Britain Real Estate and Title Co. v. Hartford Acceptance Corp., 112
Conn. 613, 153 Atl. 658 (i93i).
38. Patterson Co. v. Peoples Loan & Saving Co., 158 Ga. 5o3, 123 S. E. 704
(1924) ; Chattanooga Finance Corp. v. Bitting, 38 Ga. App. 490, 144 S. E. 331 (1928).
39. Drew v. Feuer, 185 Minn. 133, 240 N. W. 114 (931).

4o. Kearby v. Western States Securities Co., 31 Ariz. 104,

250

Pac. 766 (1926).

4L Parsons v. Rice, 81 Mont. 509, 264 Pac. 396 (1928).
42. Id. at 525, 264 Pac. at 403.
43. WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 3791-1. For a discussion of this statute see (1936) In WASH. L. Rzv. 1i8I.

6o8

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION

In view of the general conflict of opinion illustrated by the decisions
heretofore discussed, dogmatic conclusions as to the state of the law can
serve no worthwhile end. However, purely on the basis of actual results
obtained in the foregoing cases, the following tendencies would seem to be
indicated:
(i) When the assignment is absolute but the assignor has retained
possession all the time, the court will go into the true nature of
the seller's purported installment sale, and finding it "colorable"
will uphold the superior right of the subsequent claimant.
(2)
When the assignment is absolute and the assignor has transferred
possession to the installment buyer but subsequently retakes possession, the court will endeavor to protect the assignee; but if the
subsequent claimant can prove that the assignee knew of the repossession, then quaere.
(3) When the assignment is for collateral security, the court will usually protect the subsequent claimant. Particularly if the seller was
in possession of the goods at the time of the assignment, the courts
would tend to treat the transaction as a chattel mortgage and
require it to be recorded as such.
Perhaps the confusion in the cases that have dealt with this problem
is due in no small measure to an attempt on the part of the courts to apply
abstract legal analysis in reaching a preconceived result. When a decision
is based on whether "title" passed from the seller to the assignee and
thereby decides whether there is anything for the seller to pass to a fourth
party, it becomes difficult to distinguish reasons from conclusions. This is
emphasized by a realization that cases deciding that as between the seller
and the conditional buyer, title remained in the seller, and as between the
seller and the assignee the title passed to the assignee, seem to be of doubtful authority in deciding who has "title" as between the assignee and a
fourth party claiming through the seller. Probably the controlling considerations that sway the courts are: who is in the better position to take additional precautions to protect himself; who can better bear the inevitable
loss; what result will best foster in the long run the growth of an apparently
necessary addition to the financing of small business. However, until express consideration of these factors finds its way into the opinions, the relative importance of any or all of them will continue to be a matter of mere
speculation.
R. W., Jr.

